Providing nursing care for people with dementia residing in long-term care facilities poses specific challenges regarding pain practices. With underlying communication barriers unique to dementia pathologies, this population is often unable to communicate verbal sentiments and descriptions of pain. In turn, nurses caring for older persons with dementia have difficulty assessing, managing and treating pain. Objectivity is an imperative factor in healthcare pain practices; however, it is difficult to objectively evaluate someone who cannot accurately communicate their experience of pain. Therefore, (...) the authors believe that subjectivity is also an essential part of evaluating the person with dementia's experience of pain. In this critical reflection, the authors explore objectivity and subjectivity in relation to pain practices for dementia in long-term care. A historical summary of pain is provided outlining the evolution of objectivity and subjectivity related to pain practices. The authors discuss the complexities of assessing and managing pain and offer a new perspective about the role of objectivity (and co-existence of subjectivity) for nurses treating pain in the older adults with dementia. (shrink)

This article offers an account of at least some of the non-preparatory dimensions of education and their significance for a theory of educational justice. I argue that just schools should play a role in facilitating goods of childhood. I also defend an egalitarian view about the access children should have in school to the resources and opportunities associated with the non-preparatory dimensions of education.

Quantum physics is believed to be the fundamental theory underlying our understanding of the physical universe. However, it is based on concepts and principles that have always been difficult to understand and controversial in their interpretation. This book aims to explain these issues using a minimum of technical language and mathematics. After a brief introduction to the ideas of quantum physics, the problems of interpretation are identified and explained. The rest of the book surveys, describes and criticises a range of (...) suggestions that have been made with the aim of resolving these problems; these include the traditional, or 'Copenhagen' interpretation, the possible role of the conscious mind in measurement, and the postulate of parallel universes. This new edition has been revised throughout to take into account developments in this field over the past fifteen years, including the idea of 'consistent histories' to which a completely new chapter is devoted. (shrink)

have recently provided a compelling demonstration of enhanced attentional control under post-hypnotic suggestion. Using the classic color-word interference paradigm, in which the task is to ignore a word and to name the color in which it is printed (e.g., RED in green, say ''green''), they gave a post-hypnotic instruction to participants that they would be unable to read. This eliminated Stroop interference in high suggestibility participants but did not alter interference in low suggestibility participants. replicated this pattern and further demonstrated (...) that it is not due to a visual strategy (such as blurring or looking at a different location). As a historical footnote, we describe a ''case study'' from 18 years ago in which we observed the same result using a hypnotic instruction to a single highly suggestible individual that he could not read. The elimination of Stroop interference has important implications for both the study of attention and the study of hypnosis. (shrink)

This important new study presents a systematic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic markets and liberal egalitarian political morality, the study examines his contention that markets have an indispensable role to play in the articulation of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty, and state neutrality. Subjecting the central tenents of this theory to sustained critical analysis, the author argues that Dworkin's attempt to establish (...) deep affinities between the market and equality is unsuccessful and his proposed solutions to some central controversies in political theory are seriously flawed. This powerful examination of the work of America's leading public philosopher reveals some timely lessons about the hazards and limitations of the market as a device for the articulation and realization of egalitarian justice. (shrink)

Universals are a class of mind independent entities, usually contrasted with individuals, postulated to ground and explain relations of qualitative identity and resemblance among individuals. Individuals are said to be similar in virtue of sharing universals. An apple and a ruby are both red, for example, and their common redness results from sharing a universal. If they are both red at the same time, the universal, red, must be in two places at once. This makes universals quite different from individuals, (...) and controversial. (shrink)

Some say that public policy can be made without the benefit of theory--that it emerges, instead, through trial-and-error. Others see genuine philosophical issues in public affairs but try to resolve them through fanciful examples. Both, argues Robert E. Goodin, are wrong. Goodin--a political scientist who is also an associate editor of Ethics--shows that empirical and ethical theory can and should guide policy. To be useful, however, these philosophical discussions of public affairs must draw upon actual policy experiences rather than contrived (...) cases. Further, they must reflect the broader social consequences of policies rather than just the dilemmas of personal conscience. Effectively integrating the literatures of social science, policy science, and philosophy, Goodin provides a theoretically sophisticated yet empirically well-grounded analysis of public policies, the principles underlying them, the institutions shaping them, and the excuses offered for their failures. This analysis is enhanced by the author's discussion of such specific cases as the disposal of nuclear wastes and the priority accorded national defense--cases that illustrate Goodin's theoretical and methodological framework for approaching policy issues. (shrink)

Can suggestion, particularly hypnotic suggestion, influence cognition? Addressing this intriguing question experimentally is on the rise in cognitive research, nowhere more prevalently than in the domain of cognitive control and attention. This may well rest on the intuitive connection between hypnotic suggestion and attention, where the hypnotist controls the subject’s attention. Particularly impressive has been the work of Raz and his colleagues demonstrating the modulation and even the complete elimination of classic Stroop color–word interference when subjects are given a posthypnotic (...) suggestion that words are meaningless. Overriding a highly practiced, possibly even automatic response like reading is testament to the attentional control that can be exerted under hypnotic suggestion. What else do we need to know—in the Stroop context and more broadly—to obtain a clear picture of how suggestion can orchestrate attention? (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Rawls and Human Rights Minimalism State Sovereignty and the Role of Human Rights Rawls's Political Liberalism and the Doctrine of Human Rights in LoP The Importance of the Role in LoP of Rawls's Narrow Doctrine of Human Rights Rawls's Arguments for the Narrow Doctrine ldquo;Ideal” and “Non‐ideal” Theory in LoP Strategies for the International Enforcement of Respect for Human Rights Conclusion Notes.

First published in 1973, this is the first book on Paul Tillich in which a sustained attempt is made to sort out and evaluate the questions to which Tillich addresses himself in the crucial philosophical parts of his theological system. It is argued that despite the apparent simplicity in his interest in _the _‘question of being’, Tillich in fact conceives of the ontological enterprise in a number of radically different ways in different contexts. Much of Professor Macleod’s work is (...) devoted to the careful separation of these strands in his philosophical thought and to an exploration and assessment of the assumptions associated with them. This book will be of interest to readers of Tillich and philosophers who specialise in ontology and linguistics. (shrink)

The version of the invisible hand argument in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments differs in important respects from the version in The Wealth of Nations. Both are different, in turn, from the version invoked by Milton Friedman in Free to Choose. However, all three have a common structure. Attention to this structure can help sharpen our sense of their essential thrust by highlighting the questions (about the nature of economic motivation, the structure of markets, and conceptions of the public (...) interest) to which answers of certain kinds would have to be available for any of the versions to succeed. (shrink)

This paper explores tensions in Ronald Dworkin's liberal theory (and liberalism more generally) about the appropriate relationship of the state to the different conceptions of the good that may be adopted by its citizens. Liberal theory generally supposes that the state must exhibit a kind of impartiality to different conceptions of the good. This impartiality is often thought to be captured by an anti-perfectionist ideal of liberal neutrality. But neutrality is often criticized as an ideal that lacks adequate theoretical support (...) and is difficult to reconcile with liberalism's commitment to government support of various elements of a community's culture. Nonetheless, Dworkin has tried to explain systematically how his egalitarian brand of liberalism can explain the appropriateness of a particular variety of neutrality. I argue, however, that Dworkin's account of the relationship between liberalism and the good is ambiguous. I suggest that an ideal of tolerance which embraces a mild form of perfectionism fits better with the egalitarian foundations of Dworkin's liberalism than neutrality. Moreover, tolerance is an ideal through which familiar tensions about the liberal state's relationship to the good may be resolved. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical commentary on the claim advanced by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift in their book Family Values: The Ethics of Parent–Child Relationships that there is an ineliminable conflict between relationship goods and fair equality of opportunity. I argue there need be no conflict between family values and equality of opportunity in a suitably non-hierarchical society. I also argue that the idea that equality of opportunity might be served by abolishing the family is mistaken. Egalitarian justice does (...) not provide an obstacle to the realization of family values. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the analysis of the feasibility of global justice developed by Pablo Gilabert in his recent book From Global Poverty to Global Equality: A Philosophical Exploration. Gilabert makes many valuable contributions to this topic and I agree with most of his analysis. However, I identify a distinction between strategic justification and moral justification that Gilabert neglects. I show how this distinction is useful in addressing objections to the feasibility of global justice. I also claim that Gilabert (...) makes some problematic assumptions concerning the way in which global justice is morally demanding. (shrink)

Three experiments investigated two timed implicit tests of memory—word reading and color naming. Using the study–test procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 showed that studied words caused reliable facilitation in word reading but no interference in color naming relative to unstudied words. Indeed, there was a small amount of facilitation in color naming as well. Experiment 3 further explored the color naming task by alternating shorter study and test intervals and adding control trials consisting of letter strings. Although both studied and (...) unstudied words showed interference relative to the control letter strings, the amounts of interference they showed did not differ. Overall, word reading consistently displayed facilitation whereas color naming never exhibited increased interference due to word priming. Priming appears to be process-specific: It is restricted to facilitating repetition of processing previously applied to a stimulus and does not extend to influencing performance on a different task involving the same studied materials. (shrink)

Rawls' main aim in A Theory of Justice is to provide a viable alternative to the utilitarianism which has dominated so much modern moral philosophy. Although philosophers have long recognised the difficulties in the way of acceptance of a utilitarian account of judgments of justice, they have often responded by seeking merely to reformulate the principle of utility. Other philosophers, with a juster appreciation of the seriousness of these difficulties, have been prepared to reject utilitarianism in all its guises, but (...) they have failed “to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it”. What is needed, beyond a powerful reaffirmation of the familiar objections to utilitarian accounts of justice, is the careful elaboration of a radically non-utilitarian theory of justice. It is this need which Rawls sets out to meet in his book. (shrink)

‘Since the Great War began’, Professor David Orme Masson told a Melbourne audience in September 1915, ‘two statements have been made, and so frequently repeated that today they are commonplace. The first is that the result…depends on…men and more men, munitions and yet more munitions. The second is that this is a war of chemists and engineers—a war of applied science’. To Britain's assistance in this war of invention and applied science came more than 120 Australian scientists, whose particular technical (...) skills were urgently needed by the expanding munitions industries. However, their contribution to the Imperial cause and to Allied victory has been overshadowed by the heroism of ANZAC troops in Gallipoli and in France. This paper begins the task of assessing the importance of their work for Britain, and the significance of their wartime experiences for post-war Australia, as viewed through the lives of the men and their organizing genius, A. E. Leighton. (shrink)

In his recent book Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard University Press, 2008), G. A. Cohen returns to the defense of his critique of the Rawlsian doctrine of the “basic structure as subject.” This doctrine provides the centerpiece of what Rawls has to say about the domain of distributive justice—that is, about the sorts of things judgments of distributive justice are about and about the ways in which these judgments are interconnected. From the extensiveness of Cohen’s critique of this doctrine, it (...) seems clear that he wants to take a very different view of the boundaries and contours of this domain. However, despite the characteristic clarity and precision with which he describes the Rawlsian doctrine and despite the trenchancy of his criticisms, it is still a matter of some difficulty determining the respects in which he and Rawls are actually in disagreement. (shrink)

This chapter begins with an overview of John Rawls's four‐stage sequence account of how to apply justice as fairness to institutions. It focuses on the facets of institutional design: (i) How should basic democratic institutions and processes be structured so as to realize the fair value of the basic political liberties? (ii) What kinds of educational and health institutions are needed to secure fair equality of opportunity? (iii) How do principles of justice apply to the family? (iv) What implications does (...) the difference principle have for the structure of a market economy? Rawls's extension of the original position via the four‐stage sequence proceeds against the background of three kinds of pluralism. According to Rawls, occupational choice means that there is a diversity of positions open to all citizens, and no one is forced to hold or pursue specific kinds of employment. (shrink)

I argue that a reasonably comprehensive doctrine of human rights can be reconciled with at least a good deal of diversity in cultural belief and practice. The reconciliation cannot be achieved by trying to show that there is in fact a cross-cultural consensus about the existence of human rights, partly because no valid inference to the normative status of human rights can be drawn from the existence of such a consensus. However, by highlighting the premises rather than the conclusions of (...) normatively persuasive arguments for human rights, I argue that a reasonably comprehensive doctrine of universal human rights can be squared with what is known about the diversity of cultural beliefs and practices. This is because the (empirically plausible) denial that there is in fact a cross-cultural consensus about the existence of human rights can go hand-in-hand with cross-cultural endorsement of the normative considerations that underpin human rights doctrine. (shrink)

Under the first-past-the-post electoral system that is still deeply entrenched in such democracies as Canada and the United States, it is not at all uncommon in a provincial, state, or federal election for there to be a striking lack of correspondence between the share of the seats a political party is able to win and its share of the popular vote. From the standpoint of the democratic ideal what is morally unacceptable about this system is that the right to vote (...) it confers on members of the electorate is not a defensible instantiation of the fundamental right citizens have to participate on terms of equality in the collective decision-making processes that help to determine their options in life. Three common attempts by defenders of the system to shield it from this objection are considered and rejected. (shrink)

Harmonides, speaking to his teacher Timotheus, says, I suggest that should be emended to for the following reasons: 1. The phrase is, in any case, very difficult indeed after , but becomes virtually impossible in view of the order, as we have as the subject of the first four infinitives, as the subject of , and then a reversion to as the subject of.

In section I, I identify several mini-theses embedded in Amartya Sen’s theory of human rights – such theses as (1) that human rights are moral, not legal, rights, (2) that nevertheless they are not rights that are awaiting transformation into legal rights, (3) that an expansive doctrine of human rights can incorporate a broad swath of rights (civil, political, economic, social and cultural) without merely mimicking the catalogues in post-Second World War declarations and covenants, and (4) that not all the (...) obligations generated by human rights are (in Kant’s language) ‘perfect’ obligations. In section II, I argue that, both because ‘freedom’ has many interpretations and because not all human freedoms, even when they are life-enhancing, are to be protected as human rights, the distinctive features of Sen’s version of a freedom-emphasizing doctrine would be clearer if the preferred interpretation of ‘freedom’ and the particular human freedoms to be protected were more explicitly identified. While Sen’s doctrine of human rights is a freedom-emphasizing doctrine, its distinctive features – vis-à-vis competing freedom-focused accounts – would be more clearly etched if it were made clearer what the sense is in which it stresses protection of important human freedoms, especially since he concedes that not all freedoms, even when they are life-enhancing for human beings, should be protected as human rights. (shrink)